In Re: Emerita Gueson by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-5-2014 
In Re: Emerita Gueson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Emerita Gueson" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 929. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/929 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
CLD-354        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3578 
___________ 
 
EMERITA T. GUESON, M.D., 
     Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to Civ. No. 2:13-cv-04638) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
August 28, 2014 
Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed:  September 5, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In the Court of Common Pleas for Bucks County, Bank of America, N.A., filed a 
mortgage foreclosure suit against Emerita T. Gueson relating to her property at 6305 
Forge Turn, Bensalem, Pennsylvania.  Initial efforts at service failed, but a process server 
ultimately personally served Gueson.  She did not defend against the suit, and judgment 
was entered in favor of Bank of America, N.A., and against Gueson.  Gueson then 
removed the matter to federal court and sought monetary and injunctive relief.   
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 Bank of America, N.A., filed a motion to remand the case, arguing, inter alia, that 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
1
 barred the suit.  The District Court agreed, granted the 
motion to remand for that reason and others, and denied Gueson’s motions for relief as 
moot.   
 Gueson filed an appeal, which Bank of America, N.A., sought to dismiss.  Gueson 
opposed the motion, filed a document in support of her appeal, and presented a motion 
for emergency injunctive relief relating to conditions at the Bensalem property.  We 
granted the motion to dismiss the appeal, concluding that the remand order was not 
reviewable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).  We also denied Gueson’s motion for 
emergency injunctive relief as moot.  See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Gueson, C.A. No. 13-
4347 (order entered Mar. 18, 2014).  We denied Gueson’s subsequent motion for 
rehearing.  See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Gueson, C.A. No. 13-4347 (order entered Aug. 20, 
2014).   
 Gueson now presents a petition for a writ of mandamus.  Gueson argues that the 
writ should issue because the District Court erred in light of the service issue in the state 
court (she also asserts more generally that pro se litigants are at a disadvantage in state 
courts).  Gueson further contends that the District Court erred in concluding that remand 
was proper because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the suit.  She claims that she has 
suffered harm to her health and her property (she lists items in the Bensalem property that 
she wants returned and states that “6305 should be restored” to an earlier condition).   
                                              
1
 The doctrine derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
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 As Gueson recognizes, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.  See Kerr v. U.S. 
Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  Within the discretion of the issuing court, 
mandamus traditionally may be “used . . . only ‘to confine an inferior court to a lawful 
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its 
duty to do so.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  To obtain mandamus relief, a petitioner must 
show that “(1) no other adequate means exist to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s 
right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under 
the circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 Gueson does not meet the standard for mandamus relief.  Essentially, through her 
mandamus petition, Gueson seeks to appeal again from the District Court’s decision or to 
somehow continue the appeal that we previously dismissed.  However, mandamus is not 
a substitute for appeal.  See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004) 
(citations omitted); Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).  Accordingly, we 
must deny her petition.    
 
